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Tel brille au second rang, qui s’eclipse au premier.1
(Voltaire: La Henriad)
Abstract
The play-offs of the UEFA Euro 2020 qualifying tournament determine the last four
participants in the UEFA European Championship 2020. 16 teams, which have failed
to obtain a slot in the qualifying group stage, will be selected and divided into four
paths of four teams each based on the inaugural season 2018-19 of the UEFA Nations
League. We provide a critical examination of the relevant UEFA regulation and
show that its articles contradict each other and allow for an unfair formulation of the
play-off paths: it might happen that all conditions cannot be satisfied simultaneously
and a group winner might face stronger opponents than a non-group winner from
the same league despite its better performance in the UEFA Nations League. Simple
and straightforward solutions for both problems are suggested.
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1 “He shines in the second rank, who is eclipsed in the first.” Source: https://quotes.
yourdictionary.com/author/quote/539979. Downloaded 26 March 2019.
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1 Introduction
The qualification for the UEFA European Championship 2020, commonly known as UEFA
Euro 2020, gives senior men’s national football teams a secondary route to compete in the
final tournament. In contrast to previous editions, the contestants of the play-offs are not be
determined by the results of the qualifying group stage but based on the inaugural season 2018-19
of the UEFA Nations League. Therefore, the relevant regulation (UEFA, 2018a) has got some
attention even in the mainstream media (Guyon, 2019b). Since these rules have never been used
before but are rather complicated, they may contain more imperfections than usual. The current
note will identify two potential problems.
Analysis of sports rules from a theoretical perspective remains an important duty of scientific
research since tournament design is a matter of significant financial concern for all stakeholders,
and a matter of personal interest for millions of fans (Szymanski, 2003). As sports are of great
interest to a high percentage of the world’s population, there are few more important topics that
could be researched into (Wright, 2014).
It is well-known that sports rules sometimes suffer from unforeseen consequences (Kendall
and Lenten, 2017). The issue seems to be especially relevant for the UEFA (Union of European
Football Associations), the governing body of association football in Europe, as has been presented
recently. According to Dagaev and Sonin (2018), qualification for the UEFA Europa League was
incentive incompatible until the 2015-16 season, namely, a team might have benefited from losing
instead of winning. This problem occurred in a match of the 2011-12 season of the Eredivisie, the
highest echelon of professional football in the Netherlands (Csato´, 2019e). Because of the same
reason, qualification for the UEFA Champions League did not satisfy incentive compatibility
in the three seasons between 2016 and 2019 (Csato´, 2019b). The qualification for some recent
FIFA World Cups and UEFA European Championships (Csato´, 2018) also allowed for such
manipulation but could be eliminated with a marginal amendment of the rules (Csato´, 2019a).
Furthermore, it is even possible that the two teams playing a match are both interested in a
draw (Csato´, 2019d). Guyon (2018) finds several flaws in the design of the UEFA Euro 2016 and
suggests two fairer procedures. UEFA has used these results to modify the knockout bracket of
the UEFA Euro 2020 in order to reduce its unfairness. Guyon (2019a) presents a new knockout
format for the UEFA Euro 2020, which can maximise the number of home games. Finally, Haugen
and Krumer (2019) argue that tournament design is an integral part of sports management,
and demonstrate a number of shortcomings of the UEFA Euro 2020 qualification, including the
violation of a natural fairness criterion (Csato´, 2019c).
The note is organised as follows. Section 2 shortly outlines the qualification for the UEFA
Euro 2020 and presents the rules of the play-offs. Two problems are identified in Section 3.
Section 4 proposes solutions to these issues, while Section 5 concludes.
2 The play-offs of the UEFA Euro 2020 qualifying
tournament
The UEFA Euro 2020 qualifying tournament is a football competition played from March 2019
to March 2020 to select the 24 men’s national teams from the 55 UEFA members that will
participate in the UEFA European Championship 2020 final tournament.
The qualification is strongly connected to the 2018-19 UEFA Nations League. This competition
divides the national teams into four divisions called leagues according to their UEFA coefficients
at the end of the 2018 FIFA World Cup qualifiers without the play-offs: the 12 highest-ranked
teams form League A, the next 12 form League B, the next 15 form League C, and the remaining
16 form League D. The teams of a league play a home-away (double) round-robin tournament in
four groups. After ranking the teams in each group, four league rankings are established and
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aggregated into the overall UEFA Nations League ranking. In particular, the teams of League A
occupy positions 1st to 12th based on the ranking in League A, the teams of League B occupy
positions 13th to 24th based on the ranking in League B, the teams of League C occupy positions
25th to 39th based on the ranking in League C, and the teams of League D occupy positions 40th
to 55th based on the ranking in League D. This note will denote all teams by these numbers.
Table 1: An overview of the qualification for the UEFA Euro 2020
UNL rank League Place in the seeding of the UEFA
Euro 2020 qualifiers
Remark
1–4 (GW) A UNL Pot drawn into a group of fiveassured of at least play-offs
5–10 A Pot 1 —
11–12 A Pot 2 —
13–16 (GW) B Pot 2 assured of at least play-offs
17–20 B Pot 2 —
21–24 B Pot 3 —
25–28 (GW) C Pot 3 assured of at least play-offs
29–30 C Pot 3 —
31–39 C Pot 4 —
40 (GW) D Pot 4 assured of at least play-offs
41–43 (GW) D Pot 5 assured of at least play-offs
44–50 D Pot 5 —
51–55 D Pot 6 —
GW stands for group winner in the UEFA Nations League
Table 1 provides an overview of the qualification for the UEFA Euro 2020. The whole process
is regulated by two official documents (UEFA, 2018a,b). It is also discussed in Csato´ (2019c).
The UEFA Euro 2020 qualifying tournament, organised between March 2019 and November
2019, allocates the teams into 10 groups: Groups A–D get one team from the UNL Pot each,
and one team from Pots 2–5 each, Group E gets one team from Pots 1–5 each, while Groups F–J
get one team from Pots 1–6 each (see Table 1 for the composition of the pots). From all groups,
the top two, thus altogether 20, teams qualify.
The last four participants of the UEFA Euro 2020 are determined by the play-offs of the UEFA
Euro 2020 qualifying tournament. Unlike previous editions of the UEFA European Championship,
teams do not advance to the play-offs from the qualifying group stage, but they are selected
based on their performance in the 2018-19 UEFA Nations League as follows (UEFA, 2018a,
Articles 16.01–16.03):
“Sixteen teams enter the play-offs, which are played in four separate paths of four teams each,
to determine the remaining four teams that qualify for the final tournament.
To determine the 16 teams that enter the play-offs, the following principles apply in the
order given:
a. Four play-off slots are allocated to each league from UEFA Nations League D to UEFA
Nations League A, i.e. in reverse alphabetical order.
b. The UEFA Nations League group winners enter the play-offs unless they have qualified
for the final tournament directly from the qualifying group stage.
c. If a UEFA Nations League group winner has directly qualified for the final tournament,
the next best-ranked team in the relevant league ranking which has not directly qualified
will enter the play-offs.
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d. If fewer than four teams from one league enter the play-offs, the remaining slots are
allocated on the basis of the overall UEFA Nations League rankings to the best-ranked
of the teams that have not already qualified for the final tournament, subject to the
restriction that group winners cannot be in a play-off path with higher-ranked teams.
The UEFA administration conducts a draw to allocate teams to the different play-offs path,
starting with UEFA Nations League D, subject to the following conditions:
a. A group winner cannot form a path with a team from a higher-ranked league in the
overall UEFA Nations League rankings.
b. If four or more teams from a league enter the play-offs, a path with four teams from the
league in question must be formed.
c. Additional conditions may be applied, subject to approval by the UEFA Executive
Committee, including seeding principles and the possibility of final tournament host
associations having to be drawn into different paths.”
For the sake of simplicity, UEFA (2018a, Article 16.02) is called the team selection rule, while
UEFA (2018a, Article 16.03) is called the path formation rule in the following.
The four teams of a play-off path play such that the highest-ranked team is matched with the
lowest-ranked team and the two middle teams are matched against each other in the semifinals,
hosted by the higher-ranked team, while the final is contested by the winners of the semifinals,
and is hosted by the winner of a semifinal drawn in advance (UEFA, 2018a, Article 17). The
winner of this match qualifies for the UEFA Euro 2020.
The rules above are illustrated by the real results.
Example 2.1. Figure 1.a outlines the situation at the end of the UEFA Euro 2020 qualifying
tournament in November 2019. No team qualified from League D, hence the four group winners
(40–43) form Path D in the play-offs (UEFA, 2018a, Article 16.03b). From the four group winners
in League C, only team 28 (Finland) has obtained a quota, therefore team 29 (Bulgaria) enters
the play-offs (UEFA, 2018a, Article 16.02c). From League B, four teams (13, 21, 23, 24), among
them a group-winner, have failed to qualify, they form Path B in the play-offs (UEFA, 2018a,
Article 16.03b). From League A, only team 12 (Iceland) has failed to qualify. According to
(UEFA, 2018a, Article 16.02d), the remaining three slots in the play-offs are allocated to the
highest-ranked teams that failed to qualify, which are teams 30–32 from League C.
The team selection rule is detailed in Figure A.1 in the Appendix via this example.
Forming Paths A and C has required a draw. UEFA (2018a, Article 16.03a) provides that
the three group winners in League C (25–27) are in Path C, and team 30 (Israel) has been drawn
there. Consequently, Path A is formed by teams 12, 29, 31 (Hungary), and 32 (Romania) as
Figure 1.b shows.
In each path, the semifinals are hosted by the two higher-ranked teams, for example, Bulgaria
(29) plays against Hungary (31) at home. According to the random draw, the winner of this
semifinal hosts the final of Path A.
The path formation rule is detailed in Figure A.2 in the Appendix via this example.
3 The problems of the regulation
We formulate here two reasonable conditions and show that they are not guaranteed by the rules
of the UEFA Euro 2020 qualifying play-offs.
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Figure 1: The result of the qualification for the UEFA Euro 2020
Italic numbers indicate the 12 group winners
Blue underlined numbers indicate the 20 teams directly qualified
Red bold numbers indicate the 16 teams selected for the play-offs
(a) The teams that are directly qualified or selected for the play-offs
League A
A1 A2 A3 A4
1 2 3 4
5 6 7 8
9 10 11 12
League B
B1 B2 B3 B4
13 14 15 16
17 18 19 20
21 22 23 24
League C
C1 C2 C3 C4
25 26 27 28
29 30 31 32
33 34 35 36
37 38 39
League D
D1 D2 D3 D4
40 41 42 43
44 45 46 47
48 49 50 51
52 53 54 55
(b) The path formation
Path A
12 32
29 31
Path B
13 24
21 23
Path C
25 30
26 27
Path D
40 43
41 42
3.1 Consistency
The first requirement deals with the logical connections between the criteria of team selection.
Definition 3.1. Consistency: A team selection rule is called consistent if its principles do not
contradict each other. Otherwise, it is said to be inconsistent.
Inconsistency means a problem because a possible scenario not addressed by the rules can
lead to long controversies such as in the case of the qualification of the titleholder Liverpool F.C.
for the 2005-06 UEFA Champions League.
Proposition 3.1. The team selection rule of UEFA (2018a, Article 16.02) is inconsistent.
Proof. It is sufficient to provide an example where the principles are contradictory.
Figure 2.a outlines such a scenario. Teams 40-42 are group winners in League D, therefore
they enter the play-offs. However, since all other teams in League D have already been qualified,
the three group winners in League D should be in a play-off path with a higher-ranked team,
which is not allowed by UEFA (2018a, Article 16.02d).
Independently of us, this issue has been identified on an online football forum.2
2 See the post of the user “Forza AZ” on 10 October 2017, 23:41 at https://kassiesa.net/uefa/
forum2/viewtopic.php?f=5&t=3463&start=150. We are grateful to an anonymous referee for the remark.
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Figure 2: The team selection rule of the play-offs can be inconsistent
Italic numbers indicate the 12 group winners
Blue underlined numbers indicate the 20 teams directly qualified
Red bold numbers indicate the 16 teams selected for the play-offs
(a) A feasible scenario
League A
A1 A2 A3 A4
1 2 3 4
5 6 7 8
9 10 11 12
League B
B1 B2 B3 B4
13 14 15 16
17 18 19 20
21 22 23 24
League C
C1 C2 C3 C4
25 26 27 28
29 30 31 32
33 34 35 36
37 38 39
League D
D1 D2 D3 D4
40 41 42 43
44 45 46 47
48 49 50 51
52 53 54 55
(b) The suggested path formation
Path A
5 8
6 7
Path B
13 16
14 15
Path C
25 28
26 27
Path D
39 42
40 41
3.2 Fairness
The second condition concerns the strength of play-off paths. First, note that the rules differentiate
between the leagues and prefer group winners, therefore the teams can be divided into a hierarchy
of eight levels: teams 1–4 (group winners in League A); teams 5–12 (non-group winners in League
A); teams 13–16 (group winners in League B); teams 17–24 (non-group winners in League B);
teams 25–28 (group winners in League C); teams 29–39 (non-group winners in League C); teams
40–43 (group winners in League D); and teams 44–55 (non-group winners in League D).
A team that has a higher place in this hierarchy is called stronger. The implied binary
relation is denoted by ⪰: 𝑖 ⪰ 𝑗 if team 𝑖 is at least as strong as team 𝑗, 𝑖 ∼ 𝑗 if team 𝑖 is at the
same level of the hierarchy as team 𝑗, and 𝑖 ≻ 𝑗 if team 𝑖 is stronger than team 𝑗.
The play-off paths are represented by the four teams that form them.
Definition 3.2. Difficulty of play-off paths: Consider two teams 𝑖, 𝑗 participating in different
play-off paths 𝑃𝑖 = {𝑖, 𝑖1, 𝑖2, 𝑖3} and 𝑃𝑗 = {𝑗, 𝑗1, 𝑗2, 𝑗3}, where 𝑖1 < 𝑖2 < 𝑖3 and 𝑗1 < 𝑗2 < 𝑗3. The
play-off path 𝑃𝑖 of team 𝑖 is more difficult than the play-off path 𝑃𝑗 of team 𝑗 if one of the
following holds:
i) 𝑖1 ⪰ 𝑗1, 𝑖2 ⪰ 𝑗2, and 𝑖3 ⪰ 𝑗3, furthermore, 𝑖𝑚 ≻ 𝑗𝑚 for at least one 1 ≤ 𝑚 ≤ 3; or
ii) 𝑖1 ≻ 𝑗1,
and it is not true that team 𝑖 plays at home but team 𝑗 plays at away in the semifinals of the
corresponding play-off paths.
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Condition i) of Definition 3.2 is straightforward as it is more difficult to qualify against a set
of better teams. Condition ii) is necessary because the strongest opponent in a play-off path is
the likely contestant in the final. The host country is taken into account because home advantage
is a well-attested phenomenon in international football (Baker and McHale, 2018).
This order between the play-off paths is not complete: it might happen that the play-off path
𝑃𝑖 of team 𝑖 is not more difficult than the play-off path 𝑃𝑗 of team 𝑗, and vice versa.
According to the underlying idea of UEFA (2018a, Article 16), the group winners of the UEFA
Nations League are preferred in the play-offs as they cannot form a path with a higher-ranked
(stronger) team. However, this requirement still does not guarantee intra league monotonicity,
which motivates the following fairness condition.
Definition 3.3. A path formation rule is unfair if a group winner may be in a more difficult
play-off path than a non-group winner of the same league.
Although the qualification is intentionally designed in such a way that teams from League D
can obtain a place in the UEFA Euro 2020 at the expense of higher-ranked teams from Leagues
A, B or C, we think that (possibly) punishing a group winner for its better performance in the
UEFA Nations League compared to a team from the same league is hard to explain.
Proposition 3.2. The path formation rule of UEFA (2018a, Article 16.03) is unfair.
Proof. It is sufficient to provide an example where the principles do not guarantee fairness.
Figure 3.a outlines such a scenario that has been “officially presented” in UEFA (2017,
European qualifiers play-offs scenario 1), together with a possible path formation shown in
Figure 3.b. The play-off Path B of team 13 is more difficult than the play-off Path A of team 17
due to condition i) of Definition 3.2 as 20 ∼ 23, 21 ≻ 29, and 24 ≻ 30, furthermore, both teams
play the semifinal at home. However, team 13 is a group winner in League B and team 17 is
non-group winner in League B, therefore this path formation, allowed by the regulation, is unfair:
qualification through the play-offs will be more difficult for team 13 than for team 17.
Fairness can be achieved by exchanging teams 13 and 17 as presented in Figure 3.c.
This unfairness is not realised in UEFA (2017, European qualifiers play-offs scenario 1).
The following example illustrates why condition ii) of Definition 3.2 is necessary.
Example 3.1. Consider the case shown in Figure 4.a and the path formation shown in Figure 4.b.
Condition i) of Definition 3.2 is not violated because of the group winners in League B (teams
13, 14) face one group winner from League B and two teams from League C (teams 29, 30) in
Path A, while a non-group winner in League B (teams 19, 21, 23, 24) faces three teams from
League B in Path B.
However, there are two group winners from League B in Path A (both playing at home in
the semifinal) but none in Path B, which seems to be unfair because they can play against each
other in the final of Path A. Condition ii) of Definition 3.2 holds for Path A of team 14 and Path
B of team 19 since 13 ≻ 21. Hence, Figure 4.b corresponds to an unfair path formation.
Fairness can be achieved by exchanging teams 14 and 19 as presented in Figure 4.c.
4 The proposed solutions
This section provides our amendments to solve the issues discussed in Section 3.
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Figure 3: The path formation rule of the play-offs may violate the first fairness condition
Italic numbers indicate the 12 group winners
Blue underlined numbers indicate the 20 teams directly qualified
Red bold numbers indicate the 16 teams selected for the play-offs
(a) A possible scenario (UEFA, 2017, European qualifiers play-offs scenario 1)
League A
A1 A2 A3 A4
1 2 3 4
5 6 7 8
9 10 11 12
League B
B1 B2 B3 B4
13 14 15 16
17 18 19 20
21 22 23 24
League C
C1 C2 C3 C4
25 26 27 28
29 30 31 32
33 34 35 36
37 38 39
League D
D1 D2 D3 D4
40 41 42 43
44 45 46 47
48 49 50 51
52 53 54 55
(b) An unfair path formation (UEFA, 2017, European qualifiers play-offs scenario 1)
Path A
17 30
23 29
Path B
13 24
20 21
Path C
25 32
27 28
Path D
40 43
41 42
(c) A fair path formation
Path A
13 30
23 29
Path B
17 24
20 21
Path C
25 32
27 28
Path D
40 43
41 42
4.1 Guaranteeing consistency
The inconsistency of the team selection rule can be handled straightforwardly by supplementing
UEFA (2018a, Article 16.02d) with a specific clause:
“If fewer than four teams from one league enter the play-offs, the remaining slots are allocated
on the basis of the overall UEFA Nations League rankings to the best-ranked of the teams that
have not already qualified for the final tournament, subject to the restriction that group winners
cannot be in a play-off path with higher-ranked teams, or, if this is not possible, they form
a play-off path with the lowest-ranked teams that have not already qualified.”
Figure 2.b shows the result of this proposal: since there are only three teams from League D
that failed to qualify directly and there is at least one group winner among them, the remaining
slot in Path D is allocated to team 39, the lowest-ranked team that has not already qualified.
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Figure 4: The path formation rule of the play-offs may violate the second fairness condition
Italic numbers indicate the 12 group winners
Blue underlined numbers indicate the 20 teams directly qualified
Red bold numbers indicate the 16 teams selected for the play-offs
(a) A feasible scenario
League A
A1 A2 A3 A4
1 2 3 4
5 6 7 8
9 10 11 12
League B
B1 B2 B3 B4
13 14 15 16
17 18 19 20
21 22 23 24
League C
C1 C2 C3 C4
25 26 27 28
29 30 31 32
33 34 35 36
37 38 39
League D
D1 D2 D3 D4
40 41 42 43
44 45 46 47
48 49 50 51
52 53 54 55
(b) An unfair path formation allowed by the rules
Path A
13 30
14 29
Path B
19 24
21 23
Path C
25 32
27 28
Path D
40 43
41 42
(c) A fair path formation
Path A
13 30
19 29
Path B
14 24
21 23
Path C
25 32
27 28
Path D
40 43
41 42
4.2 Guaranteeing fairness
In order to avoid a possibly unfair path formation, UEFA (2018a, Article 16.03a) is worth
supplementing with a further condition:
“A group winner cannot form a path with a team from a higher-ranked league in the overall
UEFA Nations League rankings, and cannot be in a more difficult play-off path than a
non-group winner of the same league.”
The rules should also explain the comparison of play-off paths with respect to their difficulty,
analogously to Definition 3.2.
It remains a question how fairness can be achieved. We propose to follow the solution used
in the proof of Proposition 3.2 and in Example 3.1: if a group winner is in a more difficult
play-off path than a non-group winner of the same league, then simply exchange the two teams.
Note that this does not violate any principle of the regulation. If there exists more than one
appropriate exchange (for instance, both of the teams 13 and 14 have a more difficult play-off
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path than team 19), it is worth choosing randomly between them.
According to the following statement, the application of this procedure will provide fairness.
Proposition 4.1. There always exists a fair path formation that can be reached by exchanging
group winners with non-group winners of the same league if the former are in a more difficult
play-off path than the latter.
Proof. Focus on the sets of opponents 𝑂𝑘 = {𝑘1, 𝑘2, 𝑘3} of every team 𝑘 in League 𝑋. It can be
assumed without loss of generality that 𝑘1 < 𝑘2 < 𝑘3. Define a partial order between the sets
𝑂𝑘 = {𝑘1, 𝑘2, 𝑘3} and 𝑂ℓ = {ℓ1, ℓ2, ℓ3} with respect to their strength on the basis of Definition 3.2,
that is, 𝑂𝑘 ≻ 𝑂ℓ if either 𝑘1 ≻ ℓ1, or 𝑘1 ⪰ ℓ1, 𝑘2 ⪰ ℓ2, and 𝑘3 ⪰ ℓ3, furthermore, 𝑘𝑚 ≻ ℓ𝑚 for at
least one 1 ≤ 𝑚 ≤ 3, while it is not true that team 𝑘 plays at away but team ℓ plays at home in
the semifinal. Otherwise, 𝑂𝑘 ∼ 𝑂ℓ.
If the set of teams that are group winners in League 𝑋 and participate in the play-offs is
empty, then fairness holds for this particular league. Otherwise, take team 𝑖 that is a group
winner in League 𝑋 and 𝑂𝑖 ⪰ 𝑂𝑘 for all team 𝑘 that is a group winner in League 𝑋.
If the set of teams that are non-group winners in League 𝑋 and participate in the play-offs is
empty, then fairness holds for this particular league. Otherwise, take team 𝑗 that is a non-group
winner in League 𝑋 and 𝑂𝑗 ⪯ 𝑂ℓ for all team ℓ that is a non-group winner in League 𝑋.
If 𝑂𝑖 ⪯ 𝑂𝑗 , then no group winner in League 𝑋 has a more difficult play-off path than any
non-group winner in League 𝑋, therefore fairness holds for this particular league.
If 𝑂𝑖 ≻ 𝑂𝑗 , exchange teams 𝑖 and 𝑗 in their paths 𝑃𝑖 and 𝑃𝑗 . The new paths are 𝑃 *𝑖 = 𝑂𝑖∪{𝑗}
and 𝑃 *𝑗 = 𝑂𝑗 ∪ {𝑖} with the following implications for the new sets of opponents 𝑂*𝑘:
∙ 𝑂*𝑖 = 𝑂𝑗 for the particular team 𝑖 in path 𝑃𝑖 (and 𝑃 *𝑗 ) that is a group winner in League
𝑋;
∙ 𝑂*𝑘 = (𝑂𝑘 ∪ {𝑗} ∖ {𝑖}) ≺ 𝑂𝑘 for any team 𝑘 in path 𝑃𝑖 (and 𝑃 *𝑖 ) that is a group winner
in League 𝑋;
∙ 𝑂*ℓ = (𝑂ℓ ∪ {𝑗} ∖ {𝑖}) ∼ 𝑂𝑖 = 𝑂*𝑗 for any team ℓ in path 𝑃𝑖 (and 𝑃 *𝑖 ) that is a non-group
winner in League 𝑋;
∙ 𝑂*𝑗 = 𝑂𝑖 for the particular team 𝑗 in path 𝑃𝑗 (and 𝑃 *𝑖 ) that is a non-group winner in
League 𝑋;
∙ 𝑂*𝑘 = (𝑂𝑘 ∪ {𝑖} ∖ {𝑗}) ∼ 𝑂𝑗 = 𝑂*𝑖 for any team 𝑘 in path 𝑃𝑗 (and 𝑃 *𝑗 ) that is a group
winner in League 𝑋;
∙ 𝑂*ℓ = (𝑂ℓ ∪ {𝑖} ∖ {𝑗}) ≻ 𝑂ℓ for any team ℓ in path 𝑃𝑖 (and 𝑃 *𝑖 ) that is a non-group
winner in League 𝑋.
Consequently, 𝑂𝑗 , one of the lowest-ranked sets of opponents for non-group winners in League 𝑋
becomes stronger, while 𝑂𝑖, one of the highest-ranked sets of opponents for group winners in
League 𝑋 becomes weaker, therefore changing teams 𝑖 and 𝑗 is a step towards achieving a fair
path formation.
Since the number of teams and leagues is finite, this procedure is guaranteed to finish after a
finite number of steps, thus a fair path formation should exist.
An unfair path formation can usually be corrected with only one exchange of teams as we
have seen in the proof of Proposition 3.2 and in Example 3.1. Two steps are necessary, for
instance, if Path B is composed of teams 13, 14, 15, and 16 (four group winners from League B)
and Path A is composed of teams 17, 18, 19 and 29 (three non-group winners from League B
and one from League C). We conjecture that two steps are always sufficient but its verification
seems to be even more cumbersome than the proof of Proposition 4.1.
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It is worth noting here that UEFA does not provide any algorithm for team selection and
path formation rules which guarantees that the conditions of UEFA (2018a, Articles 16.01–16.03)
hold (UEFA (2017) presents only three possible scenarios). Nonetheless, it would be not a futile
exercise because the detailed description of an algorithm would help to identify some problems
such as inconsistency.
5 Conclusions
This critical note has investigated the regulation of the UEFA Euro 2020 qualifying play-offs.
We have identified two theoretical shortcomings of it, that is, logical inconsistency between
the principles and the possible unfair formation of the play-off paths. They, together with the
opportunity for strategic manipulation in the UEFA Nations League (Csato´, 2019c), warn to the
dangers inherent in reforming tournament designs with similarly complicated rules.
While the presented issues may occur with a low probability, the integrity of sports rules
require all possible scenarios to be considered in a fair way. Hopefully, our reasoning will convince
UEFA that the proposed amendments – which does not increase the complexity of the rules –
are worth implementing.
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Appendix
Figure A.1: The result of the qualification for the UEFA Euro 2020: team selection
(a) The (real-world) scenario of Example 2.1: directly qualified teams
Blue rectangles with italic numbers indicate group winners
Crossed teams indicate directly qualified teams which are unavailable for the play-offs
League A
1 2 3 4
5 6 7 8
9 10 11 12
League B
13 14 15 16
17 18 19 20
21 22 23 24
League C
24 26 27 28
29 30 31 32
33 34 35 36
37 38 39
League D
40 41 42 43
44 45 46 47
48 49 50 51
52 53 54 55
(b) The (real-world) scenario of Example 2.1: team selection for the play-offs
Group winners qualify for the play-offs unless they have already qualified
13 24 26 27 40 41 42 43
Group winners already qualified are replaced by the next best-ranked
team in the same league which has not directly qualified
1 =⇒ 12 14 =⇒ 21 15 =⇒ 23
16 =⇒ 24 28 =⇒ 29
If there is not enough teams in the league, group winners are replaced
by the best team in the overall ranking which has not directly qualified
BUT: group winners cannot play with teams from a higher league
2 =⇒ 30 3 =⇒ 31 4 =⇒ 32
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Figure A.2: The result of the qualification for the UEFA Euro 2020: path formation
(a) The (real-world) scenario of Example 2.1: teams in the play-offs
Blue rectangles with italic numbers indicate group winners
League A
12
League B
13
21 23 24
League C
24 26 27
29 30 31 32
League D
40 41 42 43
(b) The (real-world) scenario of Example 2.1: path formation for the play-offs
If four or more teams from a league enter the play-offs, a path
with four teams from the league in question must be formed
BUT: a group winner cannot form a path with a team from a higher-ranked league
Path D Semifinal 1 (SF1) 40 against 43
drawn
randomly
Semifinal 2 (SF2) 41 against 42
Final (host drawn) 𝒲/SF1 against 𝒲/SF2 =⇒ 𝒲
Path C Semifinal 1 (SF1) 25 against 30
drawn
randomly
Semifinal 2 (SF2) 26 against 27
Final (host drawn) 𝒲/SF2 against 𝒲/SF1 =⇒ 𝒲
Path B Semifinal 1 (SF1) 13 against 24
drawn
randomly
Semifinal 2 (SF2) 21 against 23
Final (host drawn) 𝒲/SF1 against 𝒲/SF2 =⇒ 𝒲
Path A Semifinal 1 (SF1) 12 against 32
drawn
randomly
Semifinal 2 (SF2) 29 against 31
Final (host drawn) 𝒲/SF2 against 𝒲/SF1 =⇒ 𝒲
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